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1  Introduction
Two things are certain about income inequality in Latin America: first, that inequal-
ity reached very high levels in the closing decades of the twentieth century, and, 
second, that it has shown a broadly shared narrowing trend in the last 10 years or so 
of this century.1 This evidence, based on comprehensive and largely consistent 
household budget surveys, raises crucial questions. Those concerned about the 
future are keen to know if this is a sustainable and lasting improvement that can 
survive the end of the recent commodity boom that has helped to finance redistribu-
tive policies. Those studying long-term inequality and its determinants would like 
to know whether inequality has always been high—a structural feature of these 
societies, or rather whether the structural transformation and changes in develop-
ment policies have been key forces shaping the inequality outcome in the region.
According to the dominant view of the institutionalist approach (Engerman and 
Sokoloff 2000; De Ferranti et al. 2004), the story of a highly unequal region largely 
reflects the persistence of the actions and omissions of the Iberian colonisers. 
However, this claim is somehow at odds with evidence that Latin American coun-
tries in the pre-industrial era were not especially unequal in an international com-
parison (Dobado and Garcia 2010; Milanovic et al. 2011). Also, inequality estimates 
during the First Globalisation show a rising trend from circa 1870 to 1920 in coun-
tries in the Southern Cone (Williamson 1999; Willebald 2011; Arroyo 2013), indi-
cating that the region’s relatively high inequality is mainly a late nineteenth- century 
1 Income inequality in Latin America since 1980 or so has been widely studied. Some of the key 
contributions are Morley (2000), López and Perry (2008), López-Calva and Lustig (2010), 
Széquely and Sámano (2012), Gasparini et al. (2011) and Birdsall et al. (2011). Urrutia (1975) 
surveys inequality studies and data in Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela covering the middle 
decades.
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phenomenon—though conditioned by inherited structural features. The latest revi-
sionist contribution is Williamson (2015) who, adopting a comparative perspective, 
argues that the colonial inequality burden is a myth. Myth or not, concerns about 
this burden seem to have been overemphasised in the literature at the expense of 
focusing on the influence of forces acting in a more recent period. It is as if, when 
trying to understand certain characteristics of a child, we give priority to investigat-
ing the lives of the great grandparents and fail to ask basic questions about the par-
ents and the sort of upbringing they provided.
Therefore, without assuming that the Big Bang occurred in 1900, this study will 
focus on inequality in the twentieth century and possible explanatory factors acting 
within this period. Here there are interesting inequality stories that we would like to 
explore in the light of a new historical dataset. First, we consider the implications of 
the different development and growth strategies implemented over the century 
(FitzGerald 2008; Prados de la Escosura 2007; Bértola 2005; Frankema 2012). 
Second, by adopting a functional approach in the construction of our inequality 
estimates, we are in a position to track the distributional fate of different occupa-
tional groups, particularly those of the top earners (dominated by property income) 
and the earnings of the unskilled. Thus we can study in a broader time frame Palma’s 
(2011) findings of the dominance of centrifugal forces operating in highly unequal 
middle-income countries (and in particular Chile and Mexico under neo-liberal 
reforms since the 1970s) that resulted in increasing income polarisation. Third, in a 
global comparative perspective, this is the century of the “Great Levelling” from 
1913 to the 1970s in the leading industrial economies (Atkinson et al. 2011; Lindert 
and Williamson 2016, Chap. 8). And it is of interest to know whether Latin America 
experienced a similar phenomenon, and, if not, why not.
In recent years there have been important efforts in quantifying inequality in 
the region in the longer term. Regarding multi-country studies,2 Williamson 
(1999, 2002) teased out developments in inequality by calculating ratios of GDP 
per worker to unskilled wages in the pre-WW2 period for a set of periphery 
countries (including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Cuba, Mexico and Uruguay).3 
Based on Williamson’s inequality ratios and available household-survey Ginis, 
Prados de la Escosura (2007) constructed pseudo-Ginis over the last century for 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Uruguay (adding Colombia and Mexico since 1913). 
Frankema (2010) studied the pattern of change in the distribution of labour 
income shares in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico during the twentieth century, 
finding that in all three countries the labour income share peaked in the middle 
decades of the last century. Also Frankema (2012) examines the long-run indus-
trial wage inequality in Argentina, Brazil and Chile based on benchmark indus-
trial surveys and census data.
2 At a country level there are long-term inequality series for Uruguay (Bértola 2005) and Chile 
(Rodriguez Weber 2014). Both studies are valuable inputs to our work.
3 Bértola et al. (2010) constructed Gini benchmarks (based on census data) for Brazil, Chile and 
Uruguay. But, unfortunately for our purposes, such benchmarks are far apart and with only one 
Gini in the twentieth century (1920), so that they do not provide an indication of trends.
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However, one important limitation of the above contributions is that they only 
provide a partial picture of long-term trends, as they either cover a limited period; 
are based on benchmark years; concentrate on a small sample of countries; or do not 
make allowances for non-labour income. These limitations make it difficult to pro-
vide a comprehensive picture of long-run inequality, particularly one that can link in 
a consistent manner outcomes from the pre-official statistics period with those of the 
more recent decades with regular household surveys. Some of these limitations are 
addressed by FitzGerald (2008) who assembles a consistent set of yearly estimates 
of earnings for four occupational groups that are used to generate Gini coefficients 
for the 1900–2000 period for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. 
However, one important shortcoming of these Ginis is that they rely on sectoral 
series of output per economically active person to estimate earning levels in two of 
the four skill groups. This implies well-functioning markets, a strong assumption for 
a developing region, particularly during the first half of the last century. Also, sec-
toral productivity estimates are subject to a large margin of error in the early decades.
Therefore, the first step to study secular inequality and its determinants in the 
region is to construct consistent and comparable series covering the long run. In this 
chapter we adopt the approach used by FitzGerald but calculate the Ginis using a 
newly assembled dataset of real wages for three occupational categories of the 
labour force (low skilled, semi-skilled and skilled labour). In this way we can offer 
new yearly series of functional inequality for Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico and Venezuela (LA-6) since 1900. Together the LA-6 have accounted for 
more than 80 % of the region’s population and income since 1900. Perhaps the main 
virtue of this work is to put on the table estimates that should inform us about long- 
term inequality and about differences and similarities across countries. Moreover, 
the methodology adopted can give a rough indication of the property-labour income 
split, as well as the relative contributions made by the income share received by the 
top earners (dominated by non-labour income) and by wage inequality (based on the 
three wage series).
When dealing with inequality in Latin America it is usually assumed that there 
exists a broad commonality in both patterns and timing across countries, so that 
regional averages are representative of individual country performance. Examples 
of this view include the use of a Latin American dummy in cross-country studies 
and its interpretation (Barro 2000), or the prominence given to a shared institutional 
heritage that perpetuates a common path of high inequality in the region 
(Bourguignon and Morrisson 2002). However, to the extent that country- specific 
factors have played a dominant role, regional averages might not be representative 
enough and general claims about inequality in the region would need to be qualified, 
or indeed avoided, if the dispersion is high. Commonality and divergence are two 
aspects to which we pay special attention here.
For the sake of brevity, this chapter concentrates on three aspects: the methodol-
ogy used in the construction of the inequality series; the analysis of the contribu-
tions of the top income group, on the one hand, and wage inequality, on the other; 
and regional averages. We largely leave for a future publication a more rigorous 
analysis of fundamental forces associated with structural change, factor endowments, 
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demographic transitions and commodity cycles. The remainder of the chapter is 
structured as follows. Section 2 summarises the methodology used to construct the 
functional (between groups) Ginis and provides complementary evidence on the 
estimation of incomes of the top group. Section 3 presents the new Ginis by country 
and a comparison with other inequality measures, and looks at the relative contribu-
tions of the top income group and of wage inequality. Section 4 presents regional 
averages. An Appendix includes charts by country.
2  Methodology4
Our method is akin to that used in the construction of dynamic social tables (com-
bining benchmark years from censa data with annual data on income from other 
sources) for Uruguay (Bértola 2005) and Chile (Rodríguez Weber 2014), as well as 
social tables (using only selected benchmark years) in pre-industrial societies 
(Milanovic et al. 2010; Lindert and Williamson 1982).5 In our case, we rely on 
annual income series (of overall income and three wage categories) and interpola-
tion between benchmarks for the shares of economically active population (EAP). 
Following the occupational categories used in ECLAC (2000), for each country we 
divide the EAP into four groups: Group 1 (employers, managers and profession-
als); Group 2 (technicians and administrators); Group 3 (semi-skilled blue-collar 
workers, other urban workers in relatively low-productivity sectors such as retail-
ing and transport, and artisans); and Group 4 (rural workers and personal service—
including domestic servants—plus unskilled urban workers and street vendors). To 
ensure consistency with the overall EAP series, the labour force in Group 3 is cal-
culated as a residual.
The main rationale for drawing the distinction between the four groups is differ-
ences in education levels and skills.6 This has been a key factor in explaining 
inequality in the region in recent decades (Morley 2000; Contreras and Gallegos 
2011). The reduced number of groups reflects data limitations during most of the 
period covered, especially on income.7 Also some arbitrary aggregation is difficult 
to avoid. For instance, in Group 1 owners of capital and landlords are lumped 
together with managers and professionals. This group is dominated by non-wage 
4 For more details on procedure, assumptions, data issues, sources and by-country figures 
on employment shares and income ratios see the background paper (Astorga 2015a), particularly 
annexes B and C.
5 Our method is also in the spirit of the distribution tables (with three main groups: the bottom 
50 %, the middle 40 % and the top 10 %) used by Piketty (2014, Part III), although a key difference 
is that, in our case, the relative size of our income groups varies over time.
6 The mean years of education by each of the four groups circa 2000 are estimated by ECLAC as 
11.4 years for Group 1; 11.2 years for Group 2; 6.5 years for Group 3; and 3.5 years for Group 4.
7 One example of groupings with higher data demands is Portes and Hoffman (2003) who work 




income, including property income and compensation for labour. Group 2 includes 
a mix of manual and clerical workers (or blue- and white-collar workers) with 
comparable years of formal education (e.g. bank tellers, typists, mechanics, turn-
ers). Group 3 lumps together urban informal workers with precarious incomes and 
highly skilled artisans with rather secure employment. Some administrators of 
micro firms included in Group 2 can have earnings below those of relatively quali-
fied workers in commerce included in Group 3. Finally, Group 4 comprises 
unskilled rural workers, together with workers in personal services, including 
domestic services, largely in urban areas.
Based on the four occupational categories we calculate the EAP share of each 
group (ni), the income share of each group (si), the mean income in each group (yi) 
and the ratio of the mean income in each group to that for the EAP as a whole (ri). 







The income share for Group 1 (s1) is defined as the residual by subtracting the 
income shares for the other three groups. This is then divided by the respective pro-
portion of the EAP to yield the group’s relative income level:
 













The income of Group 1 is likely to capture income from property (profits, 
dividends, interest, and land and natural resource rents) for all the EAP, together 
with earnings from highly paid workers.8 Because of the way it is calculated, the 
income for this group may be subject to a significant margin of error. However, this 
method is likely to generate better estimates in Latin America than calculations 
based on tax data (famously unreliable to gauge income at the top, if available at all) 
and on household surveys (which are only available for the later period and tend to 
miss information on top earners). At the end of this section we offer some comple-
mentary evidence showing that, in general, our estimates for the first half of the last 
century are consistent with data available on top earners. Also, in the following 
section we provide some additional consistency checks for our calculated s1 based 
on comparisons with official estimates of property income shares available for the 
second half of the century.
To estimate mean earnings of the remaining three occupational groups we rely 
on three real wage series assembled to reflect, when possible, differences in skills: 
relatively high, medium and low. We use the same deflator (usually the CPI) for 
8 The long-term evidence in developed economies (Piketty 2014) shows that income from property 
tends to be concentrated in the individuals included in our top group, which means that the mis-
placement of property income of individuals included in the middle and bottom groups is unlikely 
to be significant.
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both overall income per worker and wages, so that the ratios are equivalent to those 
calculated from nominal values. There is a possibility that we are overestimating 
earnings in Group 3 by assigning the average semi-skilled wage to all workers in the 
group which is calculated as a residual and is likely to include workers in the infor-
mal sector. We performed sensitivity analysis to our inequality results by assigning 
the minimum urban wage to the estimated informality share post-1950,9 and found 
no significant impact.
The methodology used to estimate gross income inequality is subject to a number 
of potential measurement biases associated with the subsistence economy and the 
unemployed. As to the size of the subsistence economy there is little systematic and 
consistent evidence for our countries which could be used to make a correction. 
Subsistence agriculture was particularly important in the early decades of the last 
century in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, and less so in the relatively 
more advanced and urbanised economies of Argentina and Chile (Berg 1970). To the 
extent that the measured overall income underestimates the subsistence economy, 
our estimates are biased against inequality because it would reduce the actual size of 
Group 1’s income, which is calculated as a residual. However, this potential bias may 
be offset by the equally likely underestimation of those working outside the market 
economy in the EAP data. The latter would result in an underestimation of the rela-
tive importance of Group 4’s earnings and, as a consequence, in higher inequality.
Regarding unemployment, there is a potential bias when estimating earnings at 
group level. Since the average wage is taken as a proxy for average earnings of the 
three lower income groups, any variance in the unemployment rate across groups 
will impart errors in our estimates. Thus at times of high unemployment, our series 
will overestimate r2, r3 and r4, and underestimate r1, underestimating inequality. This 
problem can be especially relevant during the early years of the Great Depression or 
during the outbreak of the Debt Crisis in the 1980s. In order to minimise the potential 
impact of this bias, we calculate deviations of the unemployment rate (where such 
data are available) from an assumed long-term rate (as a proxy for the natural rate of 
unemployment) and then adjust our overall income per worker series accordingly.
Table 1 presents a summary of our estimated EAP shares and relative income 
ratios for the top and bottom groups for selected years. Differences among the coun-
tries’ EAP shares are largely driven by variations in the urbanisation process, timing 
of the structural change and improvements in the education level of the labour force. 
Broadly speaking, Argentina and Chile already had significant urban populations by 
1900 reflected in relatively lower values for the economically active persons in 
Group 4 dominated by low-paid workers in rural areas, whereas according to these 
estimates, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela started the twentieth century 
with shares for that group between 65 and 75 %.10 All six countries had inflection 
points (preceding acceleration) in population growth in the 1930s and in urbanisa-
9 The average share of urban informality reported for the region during the early 1950s and late 1970s 
is about 25 % (PREALC 1982). We estimate that Group 3 may include 10 % and Group 4 15 %.
10 The estimates for the urbanisation rates circa 1900 are Argentina 38 %, Chile 34 %, Brazil 23 %, 
Mexico 28.3 and Venezuela 11 %. The first observation available for Colombia is 30.9 % in 1938. 
Our calculations are based on censa data.
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tion in the 1940s (earlier in Argentina). Differences in the level of development circa 
1900 are also reflected in the timing of the decline of the share of Group 4. The 
initial share for Argentina and Chile (around 40 %) is only reached by 1955 in 
Venezuela, and around 1980 in Brazil, Colombia and Mexico. This largely reflects 
different educational realities.11
The relative income ratios for the top group tend to show high and rising values 
during the first half of the last century (especially in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and 
Venezuela) and then a decline in the second half. The rising trend indicates a grow-
ing share of property income in total income and slow increases in the number of 
top earners. The falling trend reflects an increase in the numbers of EAP in that 
group after 1960 or so (reducing the group’s income per person engaged) in line 
with better access to education and a rapid increase in GDP per worker between 
1950 and 1970 in most countries (raising the denominator of the ratio). Meanwhile, 
the ratios of the bottom group are dominated by a steady decline over the century. 
This is largely the result of increases in the wage of the unskilled lagging behind 
advances in the overall average income. In absolute terms (not shown), the gains of 
the average income of the whole labour force compared to the gains in the mean real 
income or those in Group 4 between the start and the end of the twentieth century 
were 2.1-fold for the overall income and 1-fold for Group 4 in Argentina; 5.9 and 
1.2 in Brazil; 6.2 and 3.1 in Chile, 6.2 and 4 in Colombia; 3.3 and 1.1 in Mexico 
(circa 1921 vs. 2000); and 6.5 and 3.6 in Venezuela.
11 According to the Barro and Lee (2011), the average years of schooling and the percentage share 
of the population without schooling in 1950 were 4.9 years and 15 % in Argentina, 2.1 years and 
63 % in Brazil, 3.7 years and 21 % in Chile, 2.3 years and 40 % in Colombia, 2.2 years and 45 % in 
Mexico and 1.6 years and 49 % in Venezuela.
Table 1 EAP shares and relative income ratios, selected groups and years
Argentina Brazil Chile
n1 n4 r1 r4 n1 n4 r1 r4 n1 n4 r1 r4
1900 4.0 39.0 11.3 0.42 3.5 72.5 6.9 0.57 6.0 42.1 7.5 0.28
1920 4.3 35.2 12.5 0.32 3.9 69.0 8.4 0.54 5.1 41.9 9.4 0.47
1940 4.6 33.6 10.6 0.34 3.9 64.5 9.1 0.61 5.5 40.9 8.4 0.35
1960 6.2 21.2 8.3 0.32 4.0 55.5 14.0 0.31 7.5 32.5 6.3 0.27
1980 8.3 17.3 6.6 0.17 6.5 43.4 9.8 0.18 9.6 22.7 6.5 0.14
2000 12.1 15.1 4.6 0.22 7.9 31.9 6.8 0.14 13.7 22.0 4.8 0.16
Colombia Mexico Venezuela
n1 n4 r1 r4 n1 n4 r1 r4 n1 n4 r1 r4
1900 6.2 65.5 6.7 0.37 3.3 70.8 9.6 0.56 4.1 69.6 7.9 0.41
1920 6.0 60.7 7.9 0.37 3.5 70.8 11.9 0.53 4.6 60.0 7.8 0.37
1940 5.7 56.9 9.0 0.35 2.9 66.0 10.7 0.54 4.2 50.3 7.6 0.34
1960 7.3 48.9 7.9 0.30 4.0 55.3 10.8 0.42 5.8 37.8 10.2 0.20
1980 7.5 39.8 7.4 0.31 7.2 40.5 7.4 0.39 12.5 24.3 5.4 0.24
2000 9.1 36.0 6.5 0.27 9.5 32.4 5.8 0.19 12.3 23.7 4.9 0.28
All figures are 3-year averages except those for 1900 based on 2 years
EAP shares circa 2000 use benchmark from ECLAC (2000) except Argentina which uses ILO’s data
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2.1  The Top-Income Group
In this section we provide complementary information for the relative income of top 
earners. Table 2 presents comparisons for four of our countries. For Brazil we cal-
culate a wage ratio using data for Rio de Janeiro for factory managers and semi- 
skilled workers (e.g. masons and carpenters) for the period 1900–1930 (r1 proxy), 
and compare them with our calculated income ratio for Group 1 (r1). Both ratios 
remain stable up to 1915 and then rise to higher values between 1920 and 1930. This 
rising trend continues to be a feature of r1 up to 1950. For Chile (1900–1940) we 
have two complementary ratios: the mean income of employers (representing about 
2 % of the labour force) relative to the average wage (r1 proxy_1) and representative 
salaries of top-rank officials (e.g. ministers and directors)12 relative to an average of 
semi-skilled workers in the public sector (e.g. archivist and postman)—r1 proxy_2. 
Despite different order of magnitude, both r1 and r1 proxy_1 move in line between 
1900 and 1930. The comparison between our ratio and r1 proxy_2 shows values of 
similar magnitude, but with lower coincidence in trends, perhaps reflecting a more 
stable wage structure in the public sector.
12 Although the employment share of the public sector tended to be relatively small in the early 
decades (e.g. about 5 % in Chile and Venezuela), the salaries paid to high-rank officials could well 
be representative of earnings in Group 1.
Table 2 Top earners’ mean income relative to average income (circa values)
1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945 1950
Brazil
r1 proxy 8.2 7.9 7.8 7.0 9.1 n.a. 9.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
r1 6.9 6.8 6.3 5.1 8.4 8.8 8.6 6.7 9.1 11.6 11.5
Chile
r1 proxy_1 12.1 9.8 17.2 20.9 22.9 23.2 18.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
r1 proxy_2 7.0 6.3 6.6 5.6 6.1 5.5 6.3 5.4 5.3 n.a. n.a.
r1 7.5 7.1 6.0 7.0 9.4 10.6 9.5 10.0 8.4 7.6 7.0
Colombia
r1 proxy n.a. n.a. 5.4 4.5 4.2 4.8 5.0 5.8 5.7 4.4 4.9
r1 6.7 6.9 7.9 8.0 7.9 8.9 8.7 8.0 9.0 8.9 8.7
Venezuela
r1 proxy 6.0 6.8 6.5 6.3 6.7 6.1 6.4 5.9 n.a. n.a. n.a.
r1 7.9 7.4 7.2 10.0 7.8 7.0 6.6 8.7 7.6 7.9 9.3
r1: Mean income of Group 1 relative to overall income per worker
r1 proxy, calculated using representative occupations as follows:
Brazil: Salary of a factory manager to a semi-skilled worker (Lobo 1978)
Chile 1: Earnings per employers relative to average wages from Rodriguez Weber (2014)
Chile 2: Salaries of high-rank officials relative to medium salary in the public sector from Rojas 
(1982)
Colombia: Average salary “spokesperson and treasurer” to “doorman” in city councils (Lopéz 
Uribe 2008).




In the case of Colombia (1908–1950) we take as representative earnings for 
Group 1 the average wage of some high-rank officials in local government divided 
by the wage of low-skilled occupations in local government. Both series show 
higher ratios for the period 1925–1940 compared to early values. For Venezuela 
(1900–1936), we use the average wage of top officials in ministries divided by the 
median income in the central government. Although both ratios show similar order 
of magnitude, the proxy ratio shows no trend—again likely to reflect a more stable 
wage structure in the public sector. In sum, this complementary information on top 
earners does not show any significant divergence from our calculated relative 
incomes for Group 1 in the four countries.
3  Functional Inequality
The between-group inequality component (Lambert and Aronson 1993) is calcu-
lated as
 
Gini b n n r r
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We assume that all individuals within a group earn the mean income of such a 
group, so that the within inequality component is zero.13 Elsewhere (Astorga 2015a), 
we offer some estimates of within-group inequality for selected periods from various 
sources (including ILO’s October Enquiry) for Argentina (1936–1976), Brazil 
(1911–1937), Chile (1938–1971), Mexico (1936–1982) and Venezuela (1940–1982). 
This complementary evidence shows that geographical dispersion in earnings rose 
from early to the middle decades, and thus played a role in boosting group inequal-
ity. Data available for Brazil and Mexico confirms this. The evidence available for 
the middle decades (mostly for wage dispersion in Groups 3 and 4) also suggests 
that within-group inequality trends reinforced those in between-group Ginis. Bértola 
(2005) and Rodriguez Weber (2014) also found such reinforcing trends in Uruguay 
and Chile, respectively. In short, we think that the latter measure is a reasonable 
proxy for trends in overall functional inequality.
3.1  Comparison with Other Inequality Measures
Figure A.1 presents our functional Gini series (Gini_b) as 5-year, centred moving 
averages. We also plot three additional inequality measures. First, available house-
hold income inequality Ginis (Gini_hs):14 Note that our inequality series exclude 
13 Relying on between-group inequality is a common feature in inequality studies covering the long 
run (Milanovic et al. 2011).
14 Thorp (1998, Statistical Appendix), Széquely and Sámano (2012) and ECLAC website.
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taxes and transfers, whereas the household Ginis are usually based on disposable 
income. Secondly, the inverse of the Williamson ratio (W-ratio) from 1900 to circa 
1940 in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. And, third, Frankema’s 
Theil index of inter-industry inequality (F_ind, with a fitted moving average line).15 
In Chile we add the income Gini series estimated by Rodríguez Weber (2014). 
In the case of Mexico, because of data limitations and the distortions caused by the 
hyperinflation during the revolution, we estimate separately the earnings Gini for 
the 1900–1910 period. Thus the pre-1910 levels are not fully comparable with those 
after 1921.
The comparison with the household Ginis from a more recent period serves to 
assess the capacity of our between-group Ginis to reflect the trends in overall per-
sonal income inequality. For the years from 1950 to 2000, our series correlate rea-
sonably well with Gini_hs, especially for Brazil, Chile and Colombia. This gives us 
some reassurance that our between-group trend estimates during the first half of the 
last century are also good proxies for personal inequality trends. The association 
between both series in the first decades of this century is poor for Venezuela, which 
may be explained by the fact that our Ginis do not reflect the impact on inequality 
of recent social transfer programmes (Roberts 2012).
On the other hand, the correlation between Gini_b and the W-ratio (1900–1940) 
is mixed, with Argentina and Mexico offering the best fit, confirming a rise in 
inequality up to about 1920, whereas in Brazil and Chile there are important dis-
crepancies in the trends of both measures. Overall, this evidence does not offer 
unambiguous support for claims that the final years of the First Globalisation epi-
sode brought about a significant increase in inequality.
Intra-industry inequality also correlates well with our between-group inequality 
trends, especially for Argentina and Mexico. In Brazil both measures rise from 1920 
up to the 1980s (with an inflection point in the mid-1930s likely to reflect the indus-
trialisation plus urbanisation process), but then diverge during the last two decades 
of the last century or so. In Colombia the limited number of observations for F_ind 
shows an upward trend between the early 1960s and the late 1990s, a trend also 
apparent in Gini_b. And in Mexico, the acceleration in F_ind during the 1990s 
(likely to be associated with the country’s incorporation into NAFTA in January 
1994) is also in line with the rising trend in Gini_b. Overall, rising inequality since 
1960 or so in both measures suggests that skill-biased technological change was a 
contributing force (either by stretching the wage structure or by boosting profits) 
15 We calculate the ratio (1913 = 1) GDP per capita to real unskilled wage using Williamson (1998). 
In Brazil we present only the ratio for the Southeast region. For intra-industry inequality we calcu-
lated an index (1996 = 1) using original data in Frankema (2012). We drop an outlier observation 
in 1984 for Chile. Both indices are plotted on the right-hand side scale of the charts, whereas the 
two Ginis are on the left-hand side. We are not including the pseudo-Ginis series in Prados de la 
Escosura (2007) because they are largely a combination of the Williamson ratios and the house-
hold Ginis, both included in the charts.
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particularly during the closing decades of the last century, which was dominated by 
more open economies and trade liberalisation.16
Some additional comments are in order about our calculations for Brazil and 
Venezuela. Our Gini_b for Brazil shows a relatively low and trendless level up to 
about 1930 (though with significant fluctuations). This outcome is consistent with 
evidence from the 1920 population census of a large share of the labour force (about 
80 %) being rural, illiterate and low skilled (Bértola et al. 2009). Under such cir-
cumstances, it is likely that the maximum feasible income Gini was relatively low 
but that the extraction rate was relatively high, reflecting the fact that poorer societ-
ies have a smaller surplus for the elite to extract (Milanovic et al. 2010). The 
Brazilian daily wage data in rural areas available for the benchmark years 1911, 
1921 and 1936 (IBGE) indicate a relatively stable wage structure. A stable wage 
structure is also confirmed by urban wage series in Rio de Janeiro during the first 
three decades of the twentieth century (Lobo 1978), as well as by data assembled by 
Ball (2013) for industrial workers in selected firms in São Paulo from 1891 to 1930.
There is scant earnings data prior to 1936 for Venezuela, so our estimates for 
those years should be taken as a gross approximation. According to Valecillos 
(2007: 103), the general picture of the labour market is one dominated by roughly 
constant wages and stable wage structure up to the mid-1930s when wages started 
to rise gradually, driven by the growing importance of the oil industry. This situation 
is consistent with a roughly stable inequality shown by our Gini in the early period. 
According to De Corso (2013), GDP per worker rose 1.1 times between 1905 and 
1922, pointing to a relative increase in the remuneration to land and capital during 
the period, but not enough to result in a clear rising trend in functional inequality 
until the oil sector was in full swing.
3.2  The Top-Income Group and the Rest
Here we focus on the relative contributions to inequality of the income share of 
Group 1 (capturing concentration at the top) and a Gini coefficient of the three wage 
groups (capturing developments in the wage structure). Following Alvaredo (2010), 
the overall Gini coefficient can be expressed as
 
Gini Gini n s Gini n s +s n= + -( ) -( ) -Top Rest1 1 1 1 1 11 1 ,  (4)
16 Scholars studying the wage structure in the region based on evidence for the middle decades of 
the last century already stressed the tendency of the leading industries to pull up the general level 
of wages in the rest of the economy, with the oil or mining industry (Chile, Venezuela) as prime 
examples (Berg 1968, 4). For Colombia, Cárdenas and Bernal (1999) found that during the period 
1976–1996 both trade liberalisation and skill-complementary technological change had a positive 
impact on skill premia in manufacturing and, in turn, on inequality.
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where s1 and n1 are the income and population shares of the top group and GiniTop 
and GiniRest are the Gini coefficients for the top group and for the rest of the popula-
tion, respectively. For n1 sufficiently small, (Eq. 4) can be approximated as
 
Gini Gini s +s= -( )Rest 1 1 1,  (5)
In our case, because of lack of data GiniTop is equal to zero anyway, and GiniRest is 
approximated by the between-group Gini coefficient of the three wage groups 
(Gini_w). Thus, the overall Gini in (Eq. 5) becomes the between-group Gini (as in 
Eq. 3) and can be expressed as
 
Gini b Gini w s s_ _ .= -( ) +1 1 1  (6)
This decomposition makes it possible to separate the action of the forces affect-
ing property and labour income, a distinction that is missing in Gini coefficients 
based on household income data. Labour income inequality is driven by demand 
and supply conditions in the labour market, as well as by institutional factors such 
as minimum wage legislation or the action of unions. Ultimately, they are influ-
enced by changes in technology, international trade, structural change and 
 developments in human capital formation. In the case of property income, the usual 
dominant forces are savings and investment behaviour, inheritance laws and rate of 
return to wealth. Unambiguous inequality trends emerge when there is a falling top- 
income share and wage compression, or rising top-income share and wage expan-
sion, occurring simultaneously.
Figure A.2 offers time series on s1 (G1%) together with Gini_b and Gini_w. For 
comparative purposes we are also including available official estimates for the prop-
erty income share or, when this is not directly available, the complement of the 
labour share (Prop%).17 Trends in G1% and Prop% are broadly consistent.18 The 
second half of the twentieth century and the 2000s are dominated by upward trends 
in G1%. The rise starts in the early 1940s in Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela; in the 
late 1950s in Argentina and Chile; and in the mid-1960s in Mexico. Prior to that, the 
tendency for the secular top-income share was to fluctuate considerably around a 
trendless mean.19
A falling trend in the labour share (or a rising trend in G1%) is a common feature 
in Latin America during the closing decades of the twentieth century dominated by 
17 The sources are the BCRA (1976) in Argentina 1935–1962, van Ginneken (1979) in Mexico 
1950–1967 (our calculation, using labour shares for 1950, 1954, 1958, 1963, 1967 and 1975 from 
official sources) and the BCV for Venezuela 1957–1997. Otherwise ECLAC website (operating 
profits).
18 Also, our proxies for the labour share behave similarly to the labour shares estimated by Frankema 
(2010) for Argentina (1913–2000), with a 0.69 correlation, and Mexico (1913–2000), with a 0.68 
correlation. And it is partly consistent in Brazil (1920–2000), with a 0.76 correlation in the sub-
period 1950–1980.
19 Relatively low values in the early decades in Brazil are likely to reflect an underestimation of 
income per worker, whereas in Mexico and Venezuela they may reflect an overestimation of wages.
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market-friendly reforms.20 In the cases of Chile and Mexico, Palma (2011) locates 
the origin of the trend with the emergence of a “scissors” effect between the average 
real wage and labour productivity. In Fig. A.3 we show equivalent series for our six 
countries accompanied by the ratio between the mean incomes of Group 1 and 
Group 4 (y1/y4, or top-bottom ratio).21 We also found a “scissors” effect in Argentina, 
Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela, although in the last three cases the gap starts 
developing before the wave of neo-liberal reforms.
As to the behaviour of the top-bottom ratio, there are rising secular trends in 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela starting in the 1920s or the 1930s. 
Argentina is the odd case with a steep fall in this ratio from the first half to the sec-
ond half of the twentieth century (except for the spike in the late 1980s, likely to be 
associated with hyperinflation and a decreed freeze in wages).22 The spike in Mexico 
circa 1950 is consistent with the surge of business opportunities in the country 
(amid subdued wages) created by the war effort in the USA. In Venezuela the dou-
bling of the ratio in the 1950s is associated with a 1.9-fold rise in oil production and 
a 25 % increase in oil prices—which peaked in early 1957 during the Suez Crisis 
(Baptista 1997). Bértola (2005, Chart 9) presents a similar measure in Uruguay 
showing a significant drop during the mid-1950s and the mid-1960s, followed by a 
recovery of the ratio later on. In general the evolution of the top-bottom ratio indi-
cates that in most cases the top earners were able to increase—or at least keep—
their position relative to the mean income of the unskilled.
3.3  Wage Inequality
Secular movements in wage inequality (also reflecting the wage structure) and in 
the average real wage are plotted in Figs. A.2 and A.3, respectively. The early 
decades, dominated by export-led growth, are characterised by an expanding or a 
constant wage structure. This is the case only after 1920 or so for Brazil and Chile. 
Our evidence is consistent with the claim that during the first export-led growth era, 
immigration, lack of a well-integrated labour market and coercion (Bulmer-Thomas 
1994: 7) undermined the potential of demand-led growth favouring unskilled labour 
and wage compression (Bértola and Ocampo 2012).
20 Falling labour shares is also a common trend in both developed and developing countries since 
the 1970s or so that has been attributed primarily to globalisation, increased role of financial activ-
ity and labour market deregulation (Stockhammer 2013).
21 The wage series are weighted by the labour shares of Groups 2, 3 and 4. Labour productivity is 
calculated as GDP at constant prices divided by overall EAP. The timing of the scissors effect is 
robust to the use of GDP per worker series using the CPI as deflator.
22 In the case of Argentina, Alvaredo (2010) estimates the top 1 % income share for the period 
1932–1972 and 2002 using tax data. This share reaches a peak in early 1940s, and then, there is a 
significant fall from 1947 to 1952 followed by a steady decline to 1972. This pattern is roughly 
consistent with trends in our top-bottom ratio for the country.
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The middle decades were dominated by the import-substitution industrialisation 
strategy led by the state (Cárdenas et al. 2000). The average real wage experienced 
a sustained rise in all six countries. There was narrowing wage inequality in 
Argentina, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela, but a widening in Brazil and Chile.23 
Wage compression was favoured in some cases by government intervention in the 
labour market and by the introduction of minimum wage legislation—particularly 
effective in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico (Méndez 1950; Ericksson 1966: 16–17). 
Frankema (2012) studied industrial wage inequality in Argentina, Brazil and Chile 
and found significant differences whose origin lies in the nature of the labour mar-
ket policies and political developments, particularly in the post-WW2 decades. 
Whilst in Argentina and Chile major trend breaks can be attributed to political 
regime changes (with military coups in 1976 and 1972, respectively), in Brazil the 
process of wage inequality was gradual and in tune with a strong rise of inter- 
industry labour productivity differentials.
The closing decades show the implementation of market-friendly reforms—
including more flexible labour markets—and the return of export-led growth as the 
dominant strategy. During this period there is a tendency towards a rise in the prop-
erty income share and a widening in wage inequality, amid falling real wages. This 
is particularly clear during the “lost decade” of the 1980s marked by rising top- 
bottom ratios (in most cases, also during the 1990s), indicating that wage earners 
largely bore the cost of the adjustment. In Mexico widening wage inequality was 
driven by the trade liberalisation reform of 1985 which affected unskilled labour 
disproportionately (Hanson and Harrison 1999). Venezuela is the exception with a 
constant (1980s) and falling (1990s) wage inequality, the causes of which are likely 
to be found in the growth implosion that occurred after the end of the 1970s which 
particularly affected wages in the middle groups. In addition, within-group inequal-
ity (by educational categories) grew in Argentina and Brazil (Morley 2000).
In general, widening inequality during this period was driven by institutional 
changes that weakened the power of the unions and by a decline in real minimum 
wages. The military regimes in place in Argentina (1976–1983), Chile (1973–1990) 
and Brazil (1963–1980) effectively restricted—or banned—the action of unions, 
increased flexibility in the labour market and reduced the coverage of the minimum 
wage as part of the reform agenda (Morley 2000). Unionisation plummeted across 
the region averaging only 10.7 % of the workforce in 2005 compared to a peak of 
23 % in the 1970s (Roberts 2012). And, according to ECLAC figures, the average 
real minimum wage for the LA-6 fell, on average, 5.9 % per year during the 1980s, 
followed by a moderate recovery of 1.7 % annual growth in the 1990s. In the first 
decade of the current century wage inequality tended to decline, a trend consistent 
with that shown by labour earnings Ginis calculated from household surveys (World 
Bank 2012: 28).
23 In addition, evidence on within-group wage dispersion for Groups 3 and 4 in Argentina, Chile, 
Mexico and Venezuela (Astorga 2015a) points to narrowing or constant wage spreads in the period.
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4  Regional Averages
In this section we present some regional indices and then proceed to explore whether 
they tend to reflect commonality or if results are driven by country-specific features. 
We calculate regional inequality first as the simple average of individual countries 
using our income Ginis together with a Gini available for Uruguay24 (LA-7) and, 
second, as a population-weighted average. Figure 1 (chart on the left) shows 5-year, 
centred moving averages of the two regional averages for LA-7. We add polynomial 
fitted lines to reflect secular movements. In addition, we show the simple-average 
inequality curve for the Southern Cone—Argentina, Chile and Uruguay. This sepa-
ration is of interest because this group of countries industrialised relatively early 
and tends to display different inequality-growth dynamics.
The LA-7 averages reveal a secular process resembling a “reclined S”-shaped 
curve for 1900–2011 with an inflection point around 1940 and a peak in the closing 
decades. The peak appears a little earlier for the population-weighted Gini. There is 
a moderate decline in inequality in the early decades driven by developments in 
Brazil and Colombia (inequality in the Southern Cone remains stable). According 
to this evidence, the final years of the Belle Époque (1900–1914) were not accom-
panied by rising inequality. In the middle decades, there was a rise in inequality 
driven by the latecomer industrialisation (Brazil, Colombia and Venezuela), but 
inequality fell in the Southern Cone which might be attributed to protectionist poli-
cies favouring urban workers and labour policies fostering wage compression. From 
the 1930s, average inequality rose steeply to a plateau around the “lost decade”, and 
then declined with the turn of the new century. The “reclined S” shape is more pro-
nounced in the case of the population-weighted series.
Figure 1 (chart on the right) shows the LA-6 simple averages of G1%, Gini_w 
and Gini_b. The early decades of the last century show no trend in either the top 
group income share or the inequality among the three wage groups. But there are 
differences after the 1930s. Wage inequality rises less steeply in the 1940s and 
1950s followed by a fairly stable wage structure in the 1960s and 1970s. Then there 
is a relatively rapid rise in wage inequality in the closing decades and wage com-
pression in the 2000s. By contrast, the top-income share accelerates from the mid- 
1930s to the end of the 1970s, followed by a more moderate rise in the closing 
decades. What is apparent in Fig. 1 is that trends in between-group inequality were 
primarily driven by trends in the top group.
The chart on the left of Fig. 2 shows simple averages for the LA-6 of the real 
wage series for the three lower occupational groups (used to estimate the mean 
income of each group), and the resulting EAP-weighted average real wage. To facil-
itate the comparison Gini_w is also included. Both the average wage (wage_avg) 
and wage inequality show a rising trend from the early 1930s up to the 1960s, 
24 For Uruguay we use Bértola (2005) for the period 1908–1966 and then use Gini values based on 
household surveys from ECLAC website to complete the series to 2011. The averages during the 
period 1911–1921 exclude Mexico.
Functional Inequality in Latin America: News from the Twentieth Century
32
implying that more skilled workers benefited more than the less skilled. In the 
following two decades or so, the real wage accelerated while the wage structure 
remained roughly stable, indicating that wage earners benefited more evenly from 
economic growth.
The closing decades of the twentieth century were marked by falling real wages 
and widening wage inequality. The average real wage for the unskilled in the LA-6 
(wage_4) around 2000 returned to their 1960 levels (and 30 % below the peak 
around 1975). But there was significant labour mobility. The regional EAP share of 
Group 4 (see Table 1) came down to about 30 % in 2000 from about 45 % in 1960 
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Fig. 1 Regional functional inequality
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did rather better, seeing a 20 % rise in their average real wage (wage_3) between 
1960 and 2000 (though the 2000 value is about 15 % below the peak reached around 
1975). The average LA-6 worker in Group 2 had a 30 % rise between 1960 and 
2000, and a 10 % fall from a peak around 1980.
4.1  Dispersion and Trend Commonality
Figure 2 (chart on the right) includes three measures to account for dispersion in 
Gini levels and trend commonality. First is the coefficient of variation for the 
between-group Gini for the LA-7 (coef.var._LA7, 5-year moving averages). This 
measures diversion—or convergence—in levels, showing a clear split between two 
periods: one of relatively high average dispersion 1900–1940 (with a trough in the 
early 1920s and two spikes of dispersion in the mid-1910s and mid-1930s), and the 
other of relatively low dispersion 1940–2011 (with a trough around 1950 and two 
spikes of dispersion in the early 1960s and late 1970s).25 One possible interpretation 
of this result is that although the inequality outcome over time differs across the 
seven countries, this reflects a different timing of a common underlying process 
(e.g. of a Kuznets-Lewis type) that would eventually lead to a similar end. This 
interpretation is supported by the outcome of a panel data analysis that reveals 
important regularities in the LA-6 associated with the action of common fundamen-
tal forces (Astorga 2015b).
One drawback of the above measure is that it does not capture commonality or 
divergence in trends, so that a low value in the coefficient of variation can indicate 
catching up in Gini levels but with countries undergoing opposite inequality trends 
(as during the middle decades). To address this limitation, Fig. 2 includes two mea-
sures to track the extent of trend commonality or synchronicity over natural decades 
in the between-group Ginis (B-trend_LA7) and in the wage Ginis (W-trend_LA6). 
A high value in a given natural decade (shown as an observation in the middle of the 
decade) indicates that most countries were experiencing similar trends.26
Over the century there was higher trend synchronicity in the wage Ginis than in 
the overall, between-group, Ginis, pointing to a higher level of uniformity in devel-
opments in the labour markets (e.g. associated with minimum wage legislation and 
unionisation) than in the forces affecting incomes at the top. Movements in both 
25 The pattern of between-country dispersion (not shown) for G1% and Gini_w resembles that 
of Gini_b.
26 The score of trend commonality is calculated in two steps. First, in each country the dominant 
trend pattern in each decade is identified (rising, constant, falling, or a combination of these 
options). Then, the number of times that a given pattern occurs is added up, assigning a “1” for a 
dominant trend over a given decade or a “0.5” when there are two salient patterns (e.g. for the 
B-trend_LA7 in the 1980s: rising = 4.5; constant = 0, falling = 2.5). Those partial results are multi-
plied by itself and then added up to obtain an overall score (4.52 + 02 + 2.52 = 26.5). Finally, the 
overall score is divided by the maximum possible score (26.5/49 = 0.54). See more details in 
Astorga (2015a, Table B-3).
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trend measures show diverging trends in the first half of the twentieth century (con-
sistent with high values for the coefficient of variation) but a clear move towards 
synchronicity during the second half. Overall, based on this evidence, the 1970s and 
the 1980s come out as the decades with the highest commonality in inequality trends.
5  Conclusions
We have presented new estimates of functional income Ginis for the period 1900–
2011 covering six Latin American countries, which use newly assembled wage 
series for three occupational categories. It offers a consistent and comprehensive 
view of long-term inequality. Our method and the data have their limitations, so our 
findings need to be corroborated by future research. That said, the key findings can 
be summarised as follows:
Secular trends as well as fluctuations in inequality across the twentieth century 
exhibit important country variations, particularly prior to 1960. Our series do not 
show a shared inequality rising trend during the end of the Belle Époque, and reveal 
mixed results in the middle decades. But by the early 1960s inequality was on the 
rise in most countries reaching a peak in the closing decades of the last century amid 
the implementation of the “Washington Consensus” policies. The regional Gini 
averages (simple and population weighted) of the LA-7 show a “reclined S” shape 
with an inflection point around 1940 and a peak in the 1990s (a decade earlier in the 
population-weighted curve).
Our evidence on relative incomes and employment shares is broadly consistent 
with the Kuznets-Lewis thesis. The early decades were characterised by a high pro-
portion of rural unskilled labour with polarised income between them and those at 
the top, largely reflecting disparities between capital or land owners and low-skilled 
landless workers. As the structural change got underway, and labour moved from 
low to higher productivity sectors, wage inequality rose. It was expected that the 
urban labour force would improve their educational levels and skills, whilst the fall 
in the rural workforce and the modernisation of agriculture would bid up their 
wages. However, there is a well-known twist to the standard Kuznets-Lewis process 
in Latin America. Industrialisation stagnated in the final quarter of the last century 
and workforce growth swelled the urban informal sector creating the conditions for 
worsening inequality.
There is an absence of episodes in which falling property shares and wage com-
pression reinforced each other, generating a sustained fall in inequality. The ten-
dency for wage compression, or slow wage expansion, during the decades of 
industrialisation under protection suggests that potentially dis-equalising forces—
arising from still limited access to education and a delayed demographic transition 
favouring returns on skills—were curbed, particularly in the Southern Cone, by 
government intervention in the labour market, unionisation and workings of mini-
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mum wage policies. However, overall, they could not offset the action of centrifugal 
forces boosting disparities between those at the top and the rest of the distribution.
Inequality in the twentieth century is a story of increased polarisation but at the 
same time one of significant social mobility. For the LA-6 as an average, the esti-
mated mean real income of top earners rose from 17 times the income of the 
unskilled around 1900, 30 times around 1970 and 27 times around 2000. Those at 
the top experienced a 3.3-fold rise in their mean income between 1900 and 2000 far 
above the 2.4-fold increase of those at the bottom. A second key development was 
the expansion of the middle groups, which went from about 32 % of the overall EAP 
at the start of the century to 62 % by the end. The mean income of those at the 
middle grew 2.9-fold between 1900 and 2000. But in all three occupational wage 
groups the absolute mean income at the end of the century was no higher than that 
of about 1970.
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Fig. A.2 Concentration at the top and wage inequality (lhs: shares; rhs: Gini coefficients; all series 
5-year m.a.)
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Fig. A.3 Average wage, GDP pw and top-bottom ratios (lhs: US$ per worker/month, 1970 prices; 
rhs: ratio; all series 5-year m.a.)
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